The paper presents experiences with an economic experiment of individual decision making using the Internet. We investigate whether Internet experiments are an appropriate alternative to traditional laboratory experiments. We compare the results obtained over the Internet with those obtained in the lab using the same implementation. In particular we are interested in di erences in individual behavior. We also report on design challenges and how we have solved them.
INTRODUCTION 2 Introduction
Recently social psychologists are using the Internet as a medium for experimental research on behavior Rei97]. Indeed there are several limitations with laboratory experiments that might be overcome in an Internet setting. For example, the Internet provides the potential to reach a large subject pool which is heterogeneous in terms of education, profession, age etc. Whereas, laboratory experiments recruit their subjects predominantly among students of the same university. Also, the Internet enables \double blindness" between experimenter and subject. Furthermore, in a laboratory all participants have to be present at the same time, while an Internet experiment can be done asynchronously. These potential advantages suggest the adaption of Internet communication and emerging Internet technologies for experimental economics. However, there are requirements of economic experiments that distinguish them from their psychological counterparts, for example the generally accepted concept of monetary motivation, i.e. paying participants. Meeting these requirements raises implementational and organizational challenges. Further, the environment of subjects in a laboratory is quite di erent from the environment of subjects using a Web browser at any place in the world. To make Internet experiments comparable with laboratory experiments we have to investigate whether these di erences in uence the results of the experiment.
This paper presents our experiences with designing and performing an experiment on individual decision making using the Internet. We focus on two topics. The rst is the organizational and the software design decisions to meet the requirements speci c to experimental economics. We present a generally applicable design for Internet experiments and show how current Internet technology can be employed for its implementation. The second topic is the evaluation of data that we obtained from running the experiment. In particular we compare them with results from running the experiment in the laboratory, using the same software.
Our results can be summarized in three points:
The software that is emerging with the Internet is a useful platform for implementing economic experiments. The same implementations can be used in a laboratory (so to say, the Intranet) and in the Internet.
Running our own experiment in the Internet and in the laboratory generated similar data when average behavior is concerned. But we observed higher variances in the Internet. It has to be further investigated whether this is due to the Internet environment or due to other in uences, for example a di erent subject pool.
Otherwise we did not observe an impact of the di erent decision environment on subject behavior in our setting.
3
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes brie y the experiment setting. The design of our implementation is illustrated in Section 3. Section 4 presents an evaluation of results. Section 5 summarizes our ndings. The appendix contains a translation of the instructions and screen shots of the user-interface of our implementation.
An experiment on individual decision making
For the Internet experiment we have chosen an individual decision problem with uncertainty as in AGH + 97]. The problem is inspired by theoretical life-cycle models of saving and consumption behavior. Although the setting in the experiment is very abstract compared to real life, the aim is to observe some fundamental aspects of inter-temporal decision behavior. In particular the experiment allows to study such intertemporal decision behavior on the individual level.
In our experiment \life" consists of an unknown number of periods. In the beginning, participants are given some amount of money. Before each period they have to decide how much of the remaining amount of money they are willing to consume. Their payo at the end is the product of all single consumption levels over lifetime. The di culty in decision making is that participants do not know in the beginning how many periods they are going to \live". As a further complication, after the rst and after the second round participants are given some hints on whether their survival probability in future periods will be relatively low or high.
The precise setting is as follows: Subjects play 12 rounds of the same \game" (i.e. every player has 12 lives). In the beginning of each round they get the same amount of money (in our setting S = 11:92 units). At the beginning of each period players have to choose how much of the remaining amount they are spending in this period. The savings are accordingly decreased and the payo is multiplied by this amount. The number T of periods they are going to live is between 3 and 6. Thus, the payo P for one round is the product over consumptions x i in the periods i = 1 : : : T :
Whether a player lives 3, 4, 5 or 6 periods is determined by throwing a dice. In the beginning each player has three dices, a green, a yellow and a red one, representing three di erent survival probabilities. After the rst consumption choice one dice is excluded, the second dice after the consumption choice in period 2. After a player has chosen the amount to spend in period 3, the remaining dice, say the red one (representing survival probability 1=2), is thrown. If it gives them another period, they are asked for the consumption in period 4, if not, the round is over. This continues up to a maximum of 6 periods. The survival probability of the green dice is 5=6, 4 that of the yellow dice 2=3. After having played 12 rounds, the nal payo is the average of the payo s in the rounds.
An interesting feature of this model is that it is practically impossible for subjects to derive analytically an optimal strategy (e.g., by assuming risk neutrality and rationality). Instead subjects must act on the basis of new information about their personal survival probability. It can thus be analyzed whether participants reveal bounded rational behavior of certain types. The complexity of the underlying decision problem makes the experiment also particularly suited for the Internet since we can exclude that our players have used some decision support tool. Figure 1 shows the consumption behavior which maximizes the expected value for a risk neutral decision maker. The strategy was calculated by a backward induction that compared all possible strategies. For a detailed description of the experiment, especially for the motivation and the optimal consumption behavior see AGH + 97]. As usual, the core game is embedded in some questions asked before the rst round and after the last round. A textual explanation of the rules is shown before the game and remains present during the game.
3 THE SOFTWARE DESIGN OF THE INTERNET EXPERIMENT 5 3 The software design of the Internet experiment There exist some fundamental requirements in experimental economics that are generally seen as necessary for reliable results FS94]. The design of our game tries to ful ll as many of these requirements as possible. There are however constraints left that we could not satisfy, like to exclude that a subject is actually a group of individuals. Our approach to deal with this drawback is to compare the Internet results with the results obtained in the laboratory, using the same software. The outcome of this evaluation is presented in Section 4. This section deals with those requirements we could handle. Figure 2 shows an overview of the play. Horizontal arrows describe the main interactions between the user-interfaces (those of a subject and the administrator), and the server (which is actually a combination of a World Wide Web server and a database). Note that the implementation follows a client-server principle. Between clients and server we use standard Internet protocols. As a client su ces a standard Web browser (e.g. Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer). These browsers have the ability to display documents as well as ll-out-forms to submit decisions to the server (by using the Hypertext-Markup Language (HTML) and the Java programming language).
An overview
The procedure is partitioned into an application phase and a play phase. In the application phase subjects submit an application by an HTML form 1 . They are required to provide their e-mail address, the town and state from where they register, and information about the type and costs of Internet connection they are using.
Administration is as well done by a Web interface to the database. The administrator checks daily the applications. Subjects are noti ed of acceptance via an e-mail which contains the Web address of the game and a password. The later is necessary to login to the Web address.
After being accepted participants have one week to start the game. When they open the Webpage they nd rst a description of the experiment. At the bottom of the description a button starts the game and opens a separate window by which the participants submit their decisions. Before they play the rst round participants have to ll out a short questionnaire. We ask for age, gender, education and profession. We also ask for information about the bank account that is necessary to process the payment (see Section 3.3). After each of the 12 rounds of the game the decisions are transmitted to the server. At the end there is another short questionnaire. The rst part checks whether some plausible rules in decision making were understood by the participant, like how to react to the exclusion of the red dice in the rst period. The second part is for comments concerning our experiment. Important in our design is that subjects have to run the experiment without any interruption. Every password is locked after it has been used. Another login with the same password is only possible on request. This is to prevent the participants from reading the instructions, playing the rst rounds, thinking for some days about the decision problem and then playing the game again. We did not impose an upper limit for the time to play. However, only one subject used this freedom and played longer than the recommended one hour (see Section 4.2).
In the next paragraphs we investigate in more detail how this design satis es the standards of economic experimentation. Along with this we give the reader details on the implementation which might not be clear from the overview we have given so far. 
Subject selection
The experiment was announced by various Internet services, such as mailing-lists, newsgroups, WWW-sites, and search-engines 2 . Everyone who ful lled the following requirements, could sign-up for participation:
Internet connection with personal e-mail, browser with JAVA ability, bank account in Germany for money transfer, good German language skills.
Because we had more applications than the target of 50 participants we had to include a selection process. We tried to avoid that the same person applies twice or that applicants know each other. For that we recruited subjects from di erent Internet domains (in their e-mail and remote client address) and di erent towns.
Subjects were selected by the administrator based on the submitted attributes (e-mail, place, Internet connectivity, and the HTTP headers, including for example the Web browser that is used). More precisely, we did not accept applications in cases where double participation could not be excluded. For example, we did not accept applications that used mail aliases (e.g. webmaster) or free e-mail accounts (e.g. hotmail). Furthermore, we did not accept more than 3 applications from the same Internet domain.
Since we could not be sure that all accepted visitors will actually play, we used an iterative process. In total we had 126 applications, from which we accepted 86 and rejected 40. Out of the accepted 30 did not log in. Datasets from 6 participants were not usable because of technical problems during the game. So we got data from 50 subjects.
Payment of participants
Economic experiments have to pay participants relative to their success. Due to the explicit application phase we could limit the number of players to meet our limited budget for payments. Contrary to this, previous Internet experiments allowed everybody to participate (see, e.g., BR98]), with a randomly selected subset of participants receiving a payment. We believe that 8 our design, which guarantees all players a payo , creates more trust in the experimenter since it does not insert an additional uncertainty between performance and payo . This should lead to a more serious type of behavior.
As a method of payment we have chosen transfers to bank-accounts. To keep costs low we decided to admit only participants with a bank-account in Germany 3 . The average payo of the 12 rounds was payed to participants in this way.
Something to be considered in this context are varying costs for participation among subjects. This is due to di erent costs for Internet access depending on the type of connection. So, some participants have free Internet access, because they can use an account at a university or at their company. Other participants have to pay Internet providers depending on the connection time. Private users connecting via a modem have to pay at least a local phone call. The di erent cost structure might in uence behavior. For instance, a participant with very high costs per minute wants to play very fast. Our solution to this problem has been to ask players in the application phase for their connection costs. While we accepted players independent of their costs, the information about costs gives us at least a chance to measure its in uence.
Controlling subjects and the experimental environment
In order to put all observed e ects down to its cause one tries to exert as much control as possible in an experimental environment. A laboratory environment thus tries to exclude that decisions are made by a group instead by individuals, to control aids used in the decision making process, to exclude that the same person plays twice, utilizing learning e ects, to generate trust in the reputation of the experimenter, to ensure that subjects participate seriously and are not just playing around.
Certainly we have to do without some of these features in the Internet. So, it could not be guaranteed at all that subjects are individuals. Further we did not have any control on the help that has been available to the participants. However, as we mentioned already, the decision problem underlying our game is very hard to analyze and to solve. So in our case it is reasonable to assume that none of our subjects has been able to implement within one hour a 9 dynamic program deriving a strategy that maximizes the expected payo . And one hour was about the maximum time used by participants to play all 12 rounds.
Concerning observable learning and repeating the game we utilized the strict registration process. The process allows every \virtual" player to play the game only once. If the same person wants to register as two virtual players, he needs two di erent email addresses, two di erent bank-accounts (running on di erent names), and has to have Internet access through two di erent domains. Still these strict registration rules do not exclude that two di erent players know each other. We tried to exclude this by selecting participants from di erent regions and domains.
Concerning trust in the experimenter we had to rely on the presentation and organization of the game. So for example we did not ask for personal data in the application phase, since this might cause suspicion. We did ask for the bank-account immediate before the game starts, thus generating trust in a payment after the game. Finally, we tried to give the user-interface an academic look-and-feel, for example by including the banner of Humboldt-University.
Subjects were told to use about one hour for playing the game. This was about the average that we observed in an earlier laboratory experiment. We also believe that so much time is required to understand the problem and develop a reasonable strategy. We did not implement an upper limit on the length of a game.
Con dentiality
An important issue in the whole design is data con dentiality. We tried to guarantee this by splitting any personal data (like name, address, bank-account etc.) from the data we need for the scienti c evaluation. This was achieved by the database design. In addition, we deleted all personal data as soon as the payment process was nished. Finally all personal data was strictly password protected on the server such that only the administrator could read and change it.
Since these mechanisms might still not su ce to create trust by the subjects we also reduced the questionnaires before and after the game. Another reason was to keep communication costs for subjects low.
Finally we collected essential parts of the data only from accepted participants. For example, we could have implemented a more extensive questionnaire at application time, allowing us to improve the quality of the sample that we let participate. However this might have reduced the number of requests for participation, or we might have get incorrect information at that point. A participant who is already accepted might be less inclined to cheat.
An issue which we do not discuss here is data security during transport via the Internet. We did not implement a solution for that. However the Internet technology we used for communication (the Web protocol and client-server communication in Java) will soon have encryption as a build-in feature. So switching of versions of code underlying our implementation will give us secure communication. We expect that secure data transmission will further increase trust in the experimenters.
Technical problems
The main challenge in implementing an economic experiment in the Internet is providing a robust user-interface and communication with the server. We saw already that we should not allow participants to interrupt a game and restart it again. However, interruptions could have their origin in a broken network connection or an error in the user-interface. While we cannot guarantee robustness against failures, we have to prevent them at least. The rst contribution to this has been to test the part of the user-interface that was implemented in Java (the questionnaires and the game itself) carefully on many di erent platforms. It turned out that platform independence as it is claimed for Java is only granted to a certain degree. In particular when a Java applet connects to resources of the client machine (like the window manager which is responsible for the layout on the screen) there were many strange e ects.
After having excluded most of these e ects, the second point of failure was the network. Security policies in organizations may exclude that the type of communication protocol that we use is allowed from a computer in-house to a computer outside (so-called rewalls implement these policies). In these cases our software could not be used. To let a participant be aware of this we included a very small applet in the application page. This applet just tested the communication with the database. If it worked we knew that the communication between the game applet and the server will work as well.
The implementation which we achieved nally was very reliable. Neither the connection nor the applet itself caused problems. Actually the database, a part of the architecture that we assumed to be robust, was the least reliable part.
Remarks on previous laboratory experiment
Before we describe the results of our Internet experiment, we brie y list some changes we made with respect to a previous laboratory version of the same experiment, described in AGH + 97]. While participants got almost the same instructions (see Appendix for an English translation), we left out the personality questionaire in the beginning. Instead the Internet version asked only for some personal attributes (like age, education level, and profession). Di erent to the previous laboratory version, participants were not asked about planning decisions. Also, the list of questions after the game has been restricted to a small subset of the previous post-experimental questionnaire.
The game itself has as well been changed in some details. The random moves to exclude the dices were not ordered into two cycles, but drawn independently. No calculator had been integrated in the program. Instead, participants were free to use any available help. Finally, participants had to decide how much to spend in period 6, although it is obviously optimal to spend all the savings then 4 .
In the laboratory version, participants had the choice between the average payo and the payo from a randomly selected round. The latter was done with a real dice in front of the participants. A virtual dice replacing this procedure seemed not to be credible, so we did not o er this kind of payo .
Most of these di erences aimed at reducing the size of the program and decision data. By that we wanted to keep waiting times small when data and code are transmitted via the Internet.
Of course some of these changes (especially the planning data) might have an impact on the behavior. We could use the new Internet software in the laboratory, so to say in the Intranet, to control for this by comparing the experimental results presented in AGH + 97] with the Intranet results presented in the next section. But we do not further discuss this in the study at hand.
Experimental results
In this section we report some illustrative results from our Internet experiment. In particular we are interested in the characteristics of the subject pool that could be attracted to participate. We also compare the data obtained in the Internet with data obtained in the laboratory by using the same software. In cases where the data from the Internet is di erent from the laboratory we give some possible explanations.
Characteristics of the participants
In the Internet we had 50 subjects, which we got by the procedure described in Section 3.2. The laboratory experiment was announced by poster and lea ets in the faculty. We o ered 5 dates for the experiment for which the participants could sign on. From 60 applicants 47 participated.
Participants in the Internet came from all over Germany. In Figure 3 participants are counted by states in Germany. Based on the application information and the questionnaire we know age, education, gender, profession and attributes about their Internet connection like the browser they use, the provider, and xed and variable costs. In the lab, participants were almost exclusively students of age 20 to 27. Accordingly the education was very homogeneous. The players in the Internet were on average older and we had larger variety of participating age groups (Table 1) .
Similarly, the Internet provided us more variety in terms of education although again 86% had at least 12 years of schooling (Table 2) . A more signi cant di erence we got in the attribute \profession". While the laboratory subjects are drawn from our own department, the Web provided us predominately with subjects from other academic elds (Table 3) . We assume that the proportion of participants with non-economic academic background could have been even higher if we would not have advertised our experiment via e-mail to colleagues at other universities. 14 The variety in the Internet is smaller when it comes to gender. 45 from 50 participants in the Internet were male, in the laboratory we had 30 males among the 47 subjects. Nevertheless, our results indicate that the subject pool is more heterogeneous in the Internet than in the laboratory. We believe that this characteristic can be further improved if experiments are better advertised, for example by a central brokerage side 5 .
More for curiosity, we have recorded at which day time participants in the Internet started playing (Fig. 4) . We see that they preferred the afternoon between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. 
Decision times
After subjects had read the instructions and clicked the start button of the game we measured for each decision the time they needed. A drawback of this approach was that obviously several participants read the instructions after they had started the game 6 . Therefore we consider in the following analysis only the time subjects needed for rounds 2 to 12.
In our instructions we recommended participants to devote one hour to play the game. This was a reference point from the previous laboratory experiment. The maximum time used in the Internet was 52 minutes and 48 seconds, in the laboratory the maximum was only 34 minutes and 59 seconds. However the average time in the Internet was 15 minutes and 39 seconds which is lower than the 18 minutes and 39 seconds in the lab. Also looking at single decision times, the 5 At this point we would like to thank the commercial site spiele.de which pointed to our experiment for a couple of days 6 In the Internet experiment we had a player who used 5580 seconds to make the rst decision cost/month zero > zero number of participants 35 15 time in s/round (2-12) 86:2 83:4 Table 5 : Total payo s, standard deviations and e ciency rates mean of the Internet were a bit lower than in the laboratory experiment, whereas the standard deviation was higher. Certainly, we cannot observe whether Internet subjects were concentrated all the time. So a programmer may have used the game for entertainment between other work. As well, we cannot exclude unexpected interrupts, like for instance the doorbell or telephone ringing. This may explain some outliers in the Internet data. Taking these into account our data seems to give no indication that subjects are playing less serious in the Internet. Indeed, as we will see in the next subsection, also in the Internet subjects improved their payo in the second part of the game. Not observable have been shorter decision times when subjects had positive connectivity costs (Figure 4 ).
Average payo s and e ciency
In accordance to the observed decision times payo s in the laboratory were higher on average. Also standard deviation was lower. In both environments a slight improvement of performance from the rst 6 rounds to the second 6 rounds is observed (Table 5 ).
An indication that participants in the Internet played less attentive than in the lab is given by examining decisions in period 6. At this point of a round it is obvious to spend all the remaining amount. In 22.16% of the cases in the Internet where participants reached T = 6 they decided Internet laboratory cases 41=185 5=160 % 22:16 3:13 not to spent all of the remaining money, whereas in the laboratory this was only 3.13% (Table  6 ). This reduced the payo of the Internet participants. A reason for this behavior could be a missing warning that players are in the last period. As for the other periods, \Period 6" was only written in the headline of the decision window (see Figure 6 in the appendix). So it could be that Internet players just missed this point since they were less concentrated.
Consumption decisions
We have analyzed consumption decisions for every possible path of the game 7 . A path is de ned by the sequence of dice exclusions in the rst two periods. Figure 5 displays these paths and for each node the number of cases and observed behavior in terms of mean, minimum and maximum consumption, as well as variance of consumption.
Again in most of the cells the variance is higher among Internet subjects. However the mean of x 1 is in the Internet closer to the optimal value (assuming risk neutrality) than in the laboratory. Remarkable in these gures is the average reaction on information for decision x 2 , i.e., when subjects know the rst dice that is excluded. In the laboratory, higher survival probability is correctly recognized by lower consumption. In the Internet however, participants have on average a lower consumption when green was excluded than when yellow was excluded.
Next we compare average consumption in the rst three periods (Table 7) . For each of the six di erent paths we have evaluated the ration between the consumptions in period 1 to 3 and the overall amount, i.e., (x 1 + x 2 + x 3 )=11:92. The last column gives the value of this ratio that maximizes expected payo AGH + 97]. Again, we could not observe a substantial di erence between the Internet and the laboratory.
Due to the uncertainty of the time horizon it is always optimal to strictly reduce consumption from period to period. Tables 8 and 9 show how participants behaved in this regard. In each of sequence 1st chance move 2nd chance move Internet laboratory optimum 1 , we looked at all cases where subjects had to make these decisions, e.g. survived the 4th period and so had to decide on x 3 , x 4 and x 5 . From these cases we computed the percentage who behaved correctly or, at least behaved nearly correctly by not increasing the consumption. Again, independent from the setting Internet or laboratory, we see that only a small percentage did it correctly, while a large part of the subjects did frequently not lower the consumption level. In the laboratory data, slightly more reactions to the uncertainty of the planning horizon could be observed. Let us nally analyze one of the post-experimental questions. We have asked the following question: \Suppose you could determine in advance how many periods you are going to live. What would be your choice in order to maximize your payo (3, 4, 5 or 6 periods) ?". The correct answer is 4. Again, we see similar results in the Internet and the laboratory (see Table  10 ). We have presented our experiences of performing an economic experiment in the Internet. The results were compared with data obtained by using the same software in a laboratory setting.
To the best of our knowledge this is the rst comparison of this type. Not very suprisingly, the Internet experiment could not meet all requirements that are demanded for experimental economics. However, we did not observe remarkable di erences between the two data sets. Actually, comparing the tables we presented here with those from AGH + 97], we see di erences of the same order of magnitude between all three experiments. We thus believe that the Internet is a sound environment for experimental economics in cases where the laboratory approach has limitations. For example, it does not require a laboratory. It allows to attract a large number of participants (with payment being a major limitation). It simpli es to get participants from outside the universities, for example unionists, managers, politicians etc.. It gives participants full exibility in when to play.
The other outcome of our experiment was that Internet technology is a valuable resource for the implementation. As Web browsers are today state of the art in every PC laboratory, our Web based client-server implementation can run without any additional software installation.
In cases where no immediate reaction is required, the Internet provides a valid platform also for multi-player experiments. Examples are e-mail games (e.g. BBBS97]) or electronic markets ( BFR97] ). Only if participants have to react directly on decisions of anonymous partners, we have the natural limitation that players have to agree on a time when to play. Technically, the Internet technology is still a feasible choice.
A demo version of our implementation is available on the Web, unfortunately without payments. The URL is http://grimnir.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/spiel. Please read the instructions carefully before you start the game. Your task is to distribute a given amount of money to several periods the best way. The better you do this, the higher is your round payo . You will play 12 rounds. The average payo of all 12 rounds will be calculated at the end of the experiment and then transfered to your bank account.
During a round you have to spend money in every period. Your payo will be calculated by the product of the spent amounts of each period. The main problem is that you do not know for sure how many periods each round consists of. Three, four, ve, or six periods of play may take place in each round period. Whether periods four, ve, and six are reached is determined by throwing a dice. There are three possible dices, a red one, a yellow one, and a green one. In the following table you see in which cases you reach the next round. Note that it is impossible to play more than six periods. In beginning of each round, you do not know which of the three dices will be thrown in this round. This information will be provided only after you have already taken several decisions.
The proceeding of each of the rounds is as follows: 1st period You receive a free disposable amount of S which you can spend during the periods of the round. You can not spend more than this. You choose x1, the amount you want to spend during the rst period. Please be sure to consider carefully the amount you want to spend and the amount you want to keep for the following periods. After your decision one of the three dices is excluded randomly by the computer. Every dice will have the same exclusion probability. You will then know which of the dices will not be thrown to determine whether you reach the periods four, ve, and six. 2nd period You choose x2, the amount you want to spend during the second period. Of course, you can not choose more than what is left over from period one. After your decision one further dice is excluded randomly by the computer. Every dice will have the same exclusion probability. You then know exactly which of the three dices determines whether you reach periods four, ve, and six. 3rd period You choose x3, the amount you want to spend during the third period. After your decision, the computer will throw the remaining dice, revealing whether you reach period four or not. Every dice will have the same exclusion probability. If you do not reach the fourth period, the round is nished. The amount you did not spend up to this point of time becomes invalid. 4th period If you have reached the fourth period, you choose the amount x4. After that, the same dice will be thrown again. Your payo is determined by the product of all amounts you spent in the periods you actually reached. For example, if you reached exactly four periods, your payo is determined by: P = x1 x2 x3 x4. If you reached all six periods, your payo is: P = x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6, with x6 being the amount you left over after period ve. Please note: If you spend the amount of 0 in one of the periods, your payo will be 0 as well since one of the factors is 0. This can happen if, for example, you spend all remaining units in period four and survive, i.e. reach period ve. Then you would be forced to spend x5 = 0 (and, possibly, x6 = 0), resulting in a payo of P = 0. Therefore, you have a trade o between the risk of spending everything you have too early and the possibility that the remaining amount becomes invalid in case of an early end of the round.
When you press the start button, the game will be loaded. The download time depends on your Internet-connection. Please do not press the reload button or change the size of your browser window at this point. The experiment can be started only once using the supplied email address.
The game window o ers a button info (have a look at the menu bar) where you can nd a documentation of your former results.
When you thoroughly understand the instructions you can start the game now! 6.2 Screenshots of the program 
